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ABSTRACT
We investigate the problem of multi-agent coordination under ra-
tionality constraints. Specifically, role allocation, task assignment,
resource allocation, etc. Inspired by human behavior, we propose a
framework (CA3NONY) that enables fast convergence to efficient
and fair allocations based on a simple convention of courtesy. We
prove that following such convention induces a strategy which
constitutes an ϵ-subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated al-
location game with discounting. Simulation results highlight the
effectiveness of CA3NONY as compared to state-of-the-art bandit
algorithms, since it achieves more than two orders of magnitude
faster convergence, higher efficiency, fairness, and average payoff.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In multi-agent systems (MAS), agents are often called upon to im-
plement a joint plan in order to maximize their rewards. Typically,
coordination in a joint plan incorporates (possibly a combination
of) two distinct elements: agents may be required to take the same
action [14, 31], or agents may be required to take distinct actions
[13, 19]. The latter is ubiquitous in everyday life, e.g. managing
common-pool resources, or deciding on car/ship/airplane routes in
traffic management. This paper studies coordination in repeated
allocation games. Consider for example the problem of channel
allocation in wireless networks [36]. In such a problem, N wireless
devices contend for R transmission slots (i.e. particular frequency
band in a certain period of time), where N ≫ R. If more than one
agent access a slot simultaneously, a collision occurs and the col-
liding parties incur a cost ζ < 0. The goal then for the agents is to
transmit on different slots to minimize collisions over time. Other
scenarios include role allocation (e.g. teammates during a game),
task assignment (e.g. employees of a factory), resource allocation
(e.g. parking spaces and/or charging stations for autonomous ve-
hicles), etc. What follows is applicable to any such scenario. For
simplicity hereafter we will refer only to indivisible resources (i.e.
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS 2019), N. Agmon, M. E. Taylor, E. Elkind, M. Veloso (eds.), May 13–17, 2019,
Montreal, Canada. © 2019 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
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resources which can not be shared). Beyond the scope of repeated
games, the proposed framework can also be applied as a negoti-
ation protocol in one-shot interactions. E.g. self-driving vehicles
attempting to get a parking space can utilize such a protocol in
a simulated environment with message exchange. Conforming to
the relevant literature, in what follows we refer to the coordina-
tion problem of selecting distinct actions as the anti-coordination
problem [9, 13, 16, 19, 23].
The most straightforward solution would be to have a central
coordinator with complete information recommend an action to
each agent. This, though, would require the agents to communicate
their preferences/plans, which creates high overhead and raises
incentive compatibility and truthfulness issues. Moreover, in real-
world applications with partial observability, agents might not be
willing to trust such recommendations. On the other hand, agents
can learn to anti-coordinate their actions in a completely decentral-
ized manner. However, in a fully decentralized scheme, agents have
an incentive to ’bully’ others (stick to your action until you drive
out the competition) [25], which makes it impossible to converge
to solutions that are both efficient and fair. As such, a mechanism is
needed that employs some sort of external authority. In this paper,
we employ simple monitoring authorities (MA), with the primary
goal to keep track of successful accesses. We do not require any
planning capabilities by the MAs, nor any knowledge of the plans
and preferences of the participants; only the ability to monitor
successful accesses on their respective resource. Such MAs already
exist naturally in many domains (e.g. the port authority in maritime
traffic management [1], or the access point in wireless networks,
etc.), and can be easily introduced in the rest (e.g. an agent mon-
itoring each charging / parking station, etc.). At the end, agents
learn to anti-coordinate their actions in a decentralized manner,
while the introduced MAs allow us to impose quotas to the use of
resources and punishments upon violating them to align individual
incentives with an efficient and fair correlated equilibrium.
A second aspect of anti-coordination problems involves conver-
gence speed. Inter-agent interactions often need to take place in an
ad-hoc fashion. Typical approaches (e.g. Monte Carlo algorithms,
Bayesian learning, bandit algorithms, etc.) tend to require too many
rounds to converge to be feasible in dynamic environments and
real-life applications. Yet, humans are able to routinely coordinate
in such an ad-hoc fashion. One key concept that facilitates human
ad-hoc (anti-)coordination is the use of conventions [24]. Behavioral
conventions are a fundamental part of human societies, yet they
have not appeared meaningfully in empirical modeling of MAS.
Inspired by human behavior, we propose the adoption of a simple
convention of courtesy. Courtesy arises by the social nature of hu-
mans. Society demands that an individual should conduct himself
in consideration of others. This allows for fast convergence, albeit
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it is not game theoretically sound; people adhere to it due to social
pressure. Such problems become even more severe in situations
with scarcity of resources. Under such conditions, courtesy breaks
down and in the name of self-preservation people exhibit urgency
and competitive behavior [20]. Thus, to satisfy our rationality con-
straint (no incentive to deviate for self-interested agents) in an
artificial system, we need a deterrent mechanism.
In this paper we present a framework (CA3NONY: Contextual
Anti-coordination in Ad-hoc Anonymous games) for repeated al-
location games with discounting. CA3NONY reproduces courtesy
based on the allocation algorithm of [13], and uses monitoring and
punishments as a deterrent mechanism. It exhibits fast convergence,
and high efficiency and fairness, while relying only on occupancy
feedback which facilitates scalability and does not require any inter-
agent communication. The main contributions are:
• Introduction of an anti-coordination framework (CA3NONY)
which consists of a courteous convention and a monitoring
scheme.
• Proof that under such a framework, the use of the courteous
convention induces strategies that constitute an approximate
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
• Comparison to state-of-the-art bandit algorithms.
2 RELATEDWORK
In ad-hoc multi-agent (anti-)coordination the goal is to design au-
tonomous agents that achieve high flexibility and efficiency in a
setting that admits no prior coordination between the participants
[33]. Typical scenarios include the use of Monte Carlo algorithms
[6], Bayesian learning [2], or bandit algorithms [7, 11]. Tradition-
ally, pure ad-hoc approaches suffer from slow learning [15], which
makes pure ad-hoc coordination a very ambitious goal for real-
life applications. In this paper we propose a middle-ground ap-
proach. Inspired by human ad-hoc coordination, we incorporate
prior knowledge in the form of simple conventions. The coordination
can still be considered ad-hoc as it is not pre-programmed, rather
it involves learning. This allows for faster convergence compared
to pure ad-hoc approaches.
A convention is defined as a customary, expected and self-enforcing
behavioral pattern [24, 37]. In MAS, there are two scopes through
which we study conventions. First, a convention can be consid-
ered as a behavioral rule, designed and agreed upon ahead of time
or decided by a central authority [32, 35]. Second, a convention
may emerge from within the system itself through repeated inter-
actions [26, 35]. The proposed courteous convention falls on the
first category. It is incorporated as prior knowledge, and it is self-
enforcing since the induced strategies constitute an approximate
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated allocation game.
An alternative way to model the anti-coordination problem is
as a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem [3]. In MAB problems an
agent is given a number of arms and at each time-step has to decide
which arm to pull to get the maximum expected reward. Bandit (or
no-regret) algorithms typically minimize the total regret of each
agent, which is the difference between the expected received payoff
and the payoff of the best strategy in hindsight. As such, they sat-
isfy our rationality constraint since they constitute an approximate
correlated or coarse correlated equilibrium [21, 27, 30]. However,
the studied problem presents many challenges: there is no station-
ary distribution (adversarial rewards), all agents are able to learn
(similar to recursive modeling) which results to a moving-target
problem, and yielding gives a reward of 0 (desirable option for
minimizing regret, but not in respect to fairness). Moreover, regret
minimization does not necessarily lead to payoff maximization [15].
Nevertheless, due to their ability to learn from partial feedback,
bandit algorithms constitute the natural choice for a pure ad-hoc
approach. The latter motivates our choice to use them as a baseline,
since our agents only receive binary feedback of success or failure
upon taking their action.
Game theoretic equilibria are desirable (since they satisfy the
rationality constraint), but hard to obtain. Deciding whether an
anti-coordination (anonymous) game has a pure Nash equilibrium
(NE) is NP-complete [10]. Furthermore, allocation games often ad-
mit undesirable equilibria: pure NE which are efficient but not fair,
or mixed-strategy NE which are fair but not efficient [13]. Hence,
iterative best-response algorithms are not satisfactory. On the other
hand, correlated equilibria (CE) [5] can be both efficient & fair,
while from a practical perspective they constitute perhaps the most
relevant non-cooperative solution concept [21]. An optimal CE of
an anonymous game may be found in polynomial time [29]. More-
over, it is possible to achieve a CE without a correlation device
(central agent) [18, 21], using the history of the actions taken by the
opponents. However, we are interested in information-restrictive
learning rules (i.e. completely uncoupled [34]), where each agent
is only aware of his own history of action/reward pairs. Such an
approach was applied in [13] to design a decentralized algorithm
for reaching efficient & fair CE in wireless channel allocation games.
Yet, while the algorithm reaches an equilibrium in a polynomial
number of steps, cooperation to achieve this state is not rational. A
self-interested agent could keep accessing a resource forever, until
everyone else backs off (also known as ‘bully’ strategy [25]). In
this paper, we build upon the ideas of Cigler and Faltings and de-
velop an anti-coordination strategy that constitutes an approximate
subgame-perfect equilibrium, i.e. cooperation with the algorithm
is a best-response strategy at each sub-game of the original stage
game, given any history of the play.
A generalization of anti-coordination games, called dispersion
games, was described in [19]. In a dispersion game, agents are able
to choose from several actions, favoring the one that was chosen
by the smallest number of agents (analogous to minority games
[12]). The authors in [19] define a maximal dispersion outcome
as an outcome where no agent can switch to an action chosen by
fewer agents. The agents themselves do not have any particular
preference for the attained equilibrium. Contrary to that, we are
interested in achieving an efficient and fair outcome. Besides, in
many real world applications, the agents are indifferent to which
role/task/resource they attain, as long as they receive one (e.g.
wireless frequencies). Tackling dispersion games, and therefore
non-binary utilities, remains open for future research.
A similar approach to ours was introduced for weighted match-
ing in [17]. The authors propose a heuristic which is decentralized,
requires only partial feedback, and has constant in the total problem
size running time, under reasonable assumptions on the preference
domain of the agents. However, it is applicable in cooperative sce-
narios, and not in the presence of strategic agents.
3 THE CA3NONY FRAMEWORK
3.1 The Repeated Allocation Game
Let a ‘resource’ be any element that can be successfully assigned to
only one agent at a time. At each time-step,N = {1, . . . ,N } agents
try to access R = {1, . . . ,R} identical and indivisible resources,
where possibly N ≫ R. The set of available actions is denoted
as A = {Y ,A1, . . . ,AR }, where Y refers to yielding and Ar refers
to accessing resource r . We assume that access to a resource is
slotted and of equal duration 1. A successful access yields a positive
payoff, while no access has a payoff of 0. If more than one agent
access a resource simultaneously, a collision occurs and the colliding
parties incur a cost ζ < 0. Thus, the agents only receive a binary
feedback of success or failure. Let an denote agent n’s action, and
a−n = ×∀n′∈N\{n }an′ the joint action for the rest of the agents.
The payoff function is defined as:
un (an ,a−n ) =

0, if an = Y
1, if an , Y ∧ ai , an ,∀i , n
ζ , otherwise
(1)
We assume that rewards are discounted by δ ∈ (0, 1), and, con-
forming to real-world scenarios, that each agent n is only aware of
his own history of action/reward pairs.
Finally, we assume that the agents can observe side information
from their environment at each time-step t . We call this side infor-
mation context (e.g. time, date etc.). The agents utilize this context
as a common signal in their decision-making process, a means to
learn and anti-coordinate their actions. Let K = {1, . . . ,K} de-
note the context space. The rationale behind the introduction of
the common context is that, under completely uncoupled learning
rules, having positive probability mass on undesirable actions (e.g.
collisions) is unavoidable. Moreover, from a practical perspective,
common environmental signals are amply available to the agents
[21]. We do not assume any a priori relation between the context
space and the problem. The only constraints are that the values
should repeat periodically, and satisfy K = ⌈N /R⌉.
The context signals could be produced either on the resource
side (e.g. by the port authority in maritime traffic management, or
the access point in wireless networks), or in a decentralized manner
(e.g. in distributed networks with no authorities the senders can
attach identifier signals to data traffic [36]). Finally, in situations
where communication is possible, the agents can agree upon the
signal themselves by solving the distributed consensus problem.
3.2 Adopted Convention
The adopted convention is based on the cooperative allocation
algorithm of [13]. Each agent n has a strategy дn : K → A that
determines a resource to access at time-step t after having observed
context kt . The strategy is initialized uniformly at random in A.
If дn (kt ) = Ar , then agent n accesses resource r . Otherwise, if
дn (kt ) = Y , the agent does not access a resource but instead chooses
uniformly at random a resource r to monitor for activity. If it is
free, then the agent updates дn (kt ) ← Ar (see Alg. 1).
1This is done to facilitate the proofs. Real world problems have this property anyway
(e.g. access to radio channels, role allocation in a plan, etc.), and the algorithms we
compare to all work for slotted resources.
Algorithm 1 Learning rule.
Require: Initialize дn u.a.r. in A. Set accessedn ← False .
1: for kt ∈ K do
2: Agents observe context kt
3: if дn (kt ) = Ar & accessedn = False then
4: Agent n accesses resource r
5: if Collision(r ) then
6: Set дn (kt ) ← Y with probability pbackof f > 0
7: else
8: Set accessedn ← True
9: end if
10: else if дn (kt ) = Y then
11: Agent n monitors random resource r ∈ R
12: if Free(r ) then
13: Set дn (kt ) ← Ar
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: Set accessedn ← False
In [13], agents back-off probabilistically in case of a collision
(set дn (kt ) ← Y with probability pnbackof f ). In such a setting, it is
possible to reach a symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium. But
in order to actually play it, the agents need to be able to calculate
it. It is not always possible to obtain the closed form of the back-
off probability distribution of each resource. Furthermore, a self-
interested agent could stubbornly keep accessing a resource forever,
until everyone else backs off (‘bully’ strategy [25]).
Instead, we adopted a simple convention where agents are being
courteous, i.e. if there is a collision, the colliding agents will back-off
with some constant positive probability:pnbackof f = p > 0,∀n ∈ N .
Being courteous, though, does not satisfy the rationality constraint.
However, a uniform distribution of resources is socially optimal (i.e.
fair allocations maximize the social welfare). Hence, if we introduce
quotas to the resources and punishments upon violating them,
courtesy induces rational strategies. In the following sections we
introduce amonitoring scheme and prove that the resulting strategy
constitutes an ϵ-subgame-perfect equilibrium.
3.3 Rationality
In order to ensure the proposed convention’s rationality, the agents
must be assured that they will eventually be successful, i.e. we must
provide safeguards against the monopolization of resources. The
proposed framework employs simple Monitoring Authorities (MA).
The MAs do not require any planning capabilities, nor any knowl-
edge of the agents’ plans and preferences. Their primary goal is to
keep track of successful accesses. Depending on the domain, MAs
may already exist naturally, or can easily be introduced. Examples
include centralized MAs like the port authority in maritime traf-
fic management, or a set of decentralized MAs (one per resource)
like the access points in wireless networks, or agents monitoring
a charging / parking station. Their function is twofold. First, they
could provide occupancy signals. Agents (e.g. CA3NONY , bandit,
or Q-learning agents) must be able to receive some form of feed-
back from their environment to inform collisions and detect free
resources. This could be achieved (if possible) by the use of various
sensors, or by receiving occupancy signals (e.g. 0, 1) from the MAs.
Second, (which is their principal purpose) MAs deter agents from
monopolizing resources to the point that each agent can access a
resource only for one context value out of K . To achieve the latter,
MAs must be able to keep track of successful accesses. Upon the
violation of the imposed quotas, the framework is responsible to
enforce the necessary punishments. Punishments are application
specific. They can be individual (e.g. in a wireless scenario, if an
agent transmits to some other than the designated channel, then
his packets will no longer be relayed), or group punishments (e.g.
if quotas are exceeded, access is denied for everyone). The imposed
punishments make exceeding the quotas an irrational strategy (sim-
ulated in Alg. 1 by the accessedn flag), which in turn aligns the
individual incentives with an efficient & fair correlated equilibrium.
3.3.1 Access Monitoring. The primary function of the employed
MAs is the tracking of successful accesses by the agents. The latter
can be achieved in various ways, depending on the domain. The
simplest one would be to maintain a log with successful accesses
per episode (period of context values), whether we are dealing
with a centralized MA or set of decentralized MAs that are able to
communicate to ensure coherence. For more involved scenarios (e.g.
if we require agent anonymity per access) we may employ more
complex schemes, e.g. using tokens, or artificial currency (solely
as an internal mechanism). Note that the latter does not fence the
resources (i.e. punishments are still required). In what follows, we
present such a self-regulated monitoring scheme.
Initially all the agents that ‘buy-in’ are issued the same amount
m ∈ R of artificial cash (AC). This amount also corresponds to the
initial fee for every resource fr ←m. To allow access to resource
r , the MA of r charges fr units of AC, and monitors the event.
If there was a successful access, the MA reimburses the amount
of (1 − ξ )fr AC to the accessing agent, where ξ → 0 ∈ R is a
commission fee. Otherwise, the MA reimburses the full amount
of fr AC to the colliding agents, so that they are able to try again
for a different context value. Finally, after each episode, the MAs
lower the fee to f ′r ← (1 − ξ )fr ,∀r ∈ R. After every successful
access, the amount of AC that an agent possesses drops below the
access fee of a resource. Waiting for the fee to drop to the point
that fr = m/2 is not rational since, assuming ξ → 0, the number
of iterations required to allow accessing two resources at the same
time will reach ∞. At that point the rest of the agents will have
reached a correlated equilibrium and the adversarial agent will not
have an incentive to access an additional resource, besides the one
that corresponds to him, since it would result in a collision. If, due
to implementation constraints, we can not select a small ξ , the MAs
can change the artificial currency every I episodes, invalidating the
old one and again making such strategy irrational.
3.4 Rate of convergence
Theorem 3.1. In a repeated allocation game with N agents and R
resources, the expected number of steps before Alg. 1 converges to a
correlated equilibrium is bounded by:
O
(
N
(
log
⌈
N
R
⌉
+ 1
)
(logN + R)
)
(2)
Proof. The adopted learning rule is based on the allocation
algorithm of [13]. For N ,R,K ≥ 1, and back-off probability 0 < p <
1, the expected number of steps before the algorithm converges
is bounded by (3) 2, which for a constant back-off probability and
K = ⌈N /R⌉ gives the required bound.
O
(
(K logK + 2K)R 2 − p2(1 − p)
(
1
p
logN + R
))
(3)
□
Corollary 3.2. Under a common, constant back-off probability
assumption, p∗ = 2 − √2 minimizes the convergence time of Alg. 1 in
high congestion scenarios, i.e. N ≫ R.
Proof. According to bound (3), in high congestion scenarios
(i.e. NR = K →∞), the common, constant back-off probability that
minimizes the convergence time is:
p∗ = arg min
(
2 − p
2(1 − p)
1
p
)
= 2 − √2 (4)
□
3.5 Courtesy Pays Off
In this section we prove that if the agents back-off with a constant
positive probability pbackof f > 0, then Alg. 1 induces a strategy
that is an ϵ-equilibrium.
Suppose that in a repeated allocation game with discounting
(δ ∈ (0, 1)) the agents who collide back-off with a constant prob-
ability pbackof f > 0. Let σp denote the aforementioned strategy
(courteous strategy), and σ ∗ denote the optimal (best-response)
strategy under the monitoring authorities (possibly better than a
stage game NE). Moreover, let Un (σ ,σ−n ,δ ) = ∑∞t=0 δ tun (atn ,at−n )
denote the cumulative payoff of agent n following strategy σ , as-
suming the rest of the agents follow the strategy σ−n . The following
theorem proves that starting at any time-step, agent n does not
gain more than ϵ by deviating to the optimal strategy σ ∗.
Theorem 3.3. Under a high enough discount factor, the courteous
strategy σp constitutes an approximate subgame-perfect equilibrium,
i.e. ∀ϵ > 0, ∃δ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀δ ,δ0 ≤ δ < 1:
E[Un (σpn ,σp−n ,δ )] > (1 − ϵ)E[Un (σ ∗n ,σp−n ,δ )]
Proof. Note that E[Un (σ ∗n ,σ ∗−n ,δ )] ≥ E[Un (σ ∗n ,σp−n ,δ )], since
by playing σp−n the rest of the agents can potentially introduce addi-
tional collisions. Thus, it suffices to prove thatE[Un (σpn ,σp−n ,δ )] >
(1 − ϵ)E[Un (σ ∗n ,σ ∗−n ,δ )].
The introduced monitoring scheme prohibits the monopolization
of resources, i.e. each agent can only access a resource for his
corresponding context value. Thus, the best-response strategy’s
(σ ∗) payoff for some δ is bounded by:
E[Un (σ ∗n ,σ ∗−n ,δ )] ≤ 1 + δK + δ2K + · · · =
∞∑
i=0
δ iK =
1
1 − δK (5)
2Slightly tighter bound on the convergence speed of the adopted learning rule, based
on Theorems 12 and 13 of [13]. See the appendix for the proof.
When agents adopt the courteous convention, in each round until
the system converges to a correlated equilibrium, the agents receive
a payoff between ζ < 0 (collision cost) and 1. Thus, until conver-
gence, the expected payoff is lower bounded by ζ
τ−1∑
i=0
δ iK = ζ 1−δ τK1−δK ,
where τ is the number of steps to converge. After convergence,
their expected payoff is
∞∑
i=0
δτ+iK = δ
τ
1−δK . Hence, the convention
induced strategy’s payoff is at least:
E[Un (σpn ,σp−n ,δ )] ≥
∞∑
τ=1
Pr [conv. in τ steps] ·
(
ζ (1 − δτK ) + δτ
1 − δK
)
We can define a random variable X such that X = τ if the
algorithm converges after exactly τ steps. Since δx is a convex
function we have that E(δx ) ≥ δE(x ), therefore:
E[Un (σpn ,σp−n ,δ )] ≥
ζ (1 − δE(X )K ) + δE(X )
1 − δK (6)
By dividing (6) by (5) we get:
E[Un (σpn ,σp−n ,δ )]
E[Un (σ ∗n ,σ ∗−n ,δ )]
≥ ζ (1 − δE(X )K ) + δE(X ) (7)
E(X ) does not depend on δ . Moreover, δE(X ) is continuous in δ ,
monotonous, and lim
δ→1−
δE(X ) = 1. Thus, we can take the limit of
(7) as δ → 1−, which equals to lim
δ→1−
E[Un (σ pn ,σ p−n,δ )]
E[Un (σ ∗n,σ ∗−n,δ )] = 1 □
In order to guarantee rationality, the discount factor δ must be
close to 1 since, as δ gets closer to 1, the agents do not care whether
they access now or in some future round. Since the proposed moni-
toring scheme guarantees that every agent will access a resource
for his corresponding context value, when δ → 1, the expected
payoff for agents who are accessing a resource and for those who
have not accessed a resource yet will be the same. In other words,
the cost (overhead) of learning the correlated equilibrium decreases.
3.6 Indifference Period
In many real world applications, agents are indifferent in claiming
a resource in a period of Tind rounds, i.e. δt = 1,∀t ≤ Tind . E.g.
data of wireless transmitting devices might remain relevant for
a specific time-window, during which the agent is indifferent of
transmitting. In such cases, we can use the Markov bound to prove
that with high probability the proposed algorithm will converge in
underTind time-steps, thus satisfying the rationality constraint. We
assume the agents are willing to accept linear ‘delay’ with regard
to the number of resources R, the number of agents N , and the size
of the context space K , specifically:
Tind = O (RNK) (8)
Theorem 3.4. Under a linear indifference period Tind (i.e. δt =
1,∀t ≤ Tind = O (RNK)) the probability of the system of agents
following Alg. 1 not having converged during Tind diminishes as the
congestion increases (NR →∞).
Proof. Using the Markov bound, it follows that the probability
that the system takes more than the accepted number of steps (Tind )
to converge is:
Pr [¬conv. after Tind ] = O
©­­«
(
log
⌈N
R
⌉
+ 1
)
(logN + R)
N
ª®®¬
Taking the limit: lim
N
R →∞
Pr [¬conv. after Tind ] = 0. □
Even though the Markov’s inequality generally does not give
very good bounds when used directly, Th. 3.4 proves that our al-
gorithm converges in the required time with high probability. The
latter holds under high congestion, which constitutes the more
interesting scenario since for small number of agents the required
time to converge is only a few hundreds of time-steps. Moreover,
the higher the indifference period, the higher the probability to
converge under such time-constraint. For quasilinear indifference
period for example, the system converges in the required time-
window with high probability even for a small number of agents.
We can further strengthen our rationality hypothesis by using a
tighter bound (e.g. Chebyshev’s inequality), albeit computing the
theoretical variance of the convergence time is an arduous task,
thus it remains open for future work.
4 EVALUATION
In this section we model the resource allocation problem as a
multi-armed bandit problem and provide simulation results of
CA3NONY’s performance in comparison to state-of-the-art, well
established bandit algorithms, namely the EXP4 [4], EXP4.P [8],
and EXP3 [4]. In every case we report the average value over 128
runs of the same simulation. For the EXP family of algorithms, the
input parameters are set to their optimal values, as prescribed in
the aforementioned publications. We assume a reward of 1 for a
successful access, −1 if there is a collision, and 0 if the agent yielded.
4.0.1 Level of Courtesy. We evaluated different back-off prob-
abilities (pbackof f ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 2 −
√
2, 0.75, 0.9}) for R = K ∈
{2, 4, 8, 16} and N = R × K . There was no significant difference in
convergence time, but since pbackof f is directly correlated with the
number of collisions, it can have significant impact on the average
payoff (see Table 1). It is important to note, though, that agents do
not have global nor local knowledge of the level of congestion of
the system (they only receive binary occupancy feedback for one
resource per time-step). Thus, agents can not select the optimal
back-off probability depending on congestion. In what follows, the
back-off probability of CA3NONY is set to pbackof f = 2 −
√
2 of
Eq. 4, which is only optimal under high congestion settings (i.e.
N
R = K →∞), yet constitutes a safe option. Note that the provided
theoretical analysis holds for any constant back-off probability.
4.0.2 Bandits & Monitoring. CA3NONY has three meta actions
(Access, Yield, and Monitor {A,Y ,M}), while bandit algorithms
have only two ({A,Y }), and CA3NONY assumes the existence of
monitoring authorities (MAs). For fairness’ sake in the reported
results, we made the following two modifications. First, we include
Table 1: Avg. payoffdepending on the level of courtesy (back-
off probability), K = R,N = R × K .
pbackof f R = 2 R = 4 R = 8 R = 16
0.1 37.6 -4.7 -39.5 -63.1
0.25 43.6 10.0 -16.9 -40.0
2 − √2 45.7 15.6 -5.2 -23.0
0.75 45.5 15.7 -3.7 -20.6
0.9 44.2 12.5 -5.8 -19.4
a variation of CA3NONY , denoted as CA3NONY*, where we as-
sume agents incur a cost (equal to collision cost ζ ) every time they
monitor a resource (reflected in Table 3). Second, all the employed
bandit algorithms make use of the MAs, which indirectly grants
them the the ability to monitor resources as well. More specifically,
the accumulated payoff is updated only if they are allowed to access
a resource. If not, we consider it a monitoring action, which means
the agents still receive occupancy feedback. The latter is important,
otherwise the bandit algorithms would require significantly longer
time to converge. Note that, contrary to CA3NONY*, monitoring is
free for bandit algorithms with respect to the accumulated payoff,
i.e. they do not incur a collision cost.
4.1 Employed Bandit Algorithms
The reward of each arm does not follow a fixed probability distribu-
tion (adversarial setting). Moreover, the agents are able to observe
side-information (context) at each time-step t . The arm that yields
the highest expected reward can be different depending on the con-
text. Hence we focus on adversarial contextual bandit algorithms
(see [38] for a survey). A typical approach is to use expert advice.
In this method we assume a set of expertsM = {1, . . . ,M} who
generate a probability distribution on which arm to pull depending
on the context. A no-regret algorithm performs asymptotically as
well as the best expert. Such algorithms are the EXP4 and EXP4.P,
the difference being that EXP4 exhibits high variance [38], while
EXP4.P achieves the same regret with high probability by combining
the confidence bounds of UCB1 [3] and EXP4. The computational
complexity and memory requirements of the above algorithms are
linear inM , making them intractable for large number of experts.
In order to deal with the increased complexity in larger simulations,
we gave an edge to these algorithms by restricting the set of experts
M to the same uniform correlated equilibria (CE) that CA3NONY
converges to. The latter enabled us to perform larger simulations
(the unrestricted versions could not handle N ≥ 64), while resulting
in the same order of magnitude convergence time, slightly higher
average payoff, and significantly higher fairness (> 35% since by
design the experts proposed fair CE). Alternatively, we can use
non-contextual adversarial bandit algorithms, such as the EXP3.
Moreover, we can convert EXP3 to a contextual algorithm by set-
ting up a separate instance for all k ∈ K . We call this ‘CEXP3’. This
results in a contextual bandit algorithm which has the edge over
EXP4 from an implementation viewpoint since its running time
at each time-step is O(R) and its memory requirement is O(KR)
(CA3NONY’s is O(1) and O(K) respectively).
Figure 1: Utilization: R = 4,N = 16 (x-axis in log scale).
4.2 Simulation Results
4.2.1 Convergence Speed & Efficiency. We know that CA3NONY
converges to a CE which is efficient. If all agents follow the cour-
teous convention of Alg. 1, the system converges to a state where
no resources remain un-utilized and there are no collisions (Th.
13 of [13]). Furthermore, Th. 3.1 argues for fast convergence. The
former are both corroborated by Fig. 1 (similar results (> ×102
faster convergence) were acquired for R ∈ {2, 8, 16} as well.). Fig.
1 depicts the total utilization of resources for a simulation period
of T = 106 time-steps. Note that the x-axis is in logarithmic scale.
CA3NONY converges significantly (> ×102) faster than the bandit
algorithms to a state of 100% efficiency. On the other hand, the ban-
dit algorithms exhibit high variance, never achieve 100% efficiency,
and are not able to handle efficiently the increase in context space
size and number of resources.
4.2.2 Fairness. The usual predicament of efficient equilibria for
allocation games is that they assign the resources only to a fixed sub-
set of agents, which leads to an unfair result (e.g. an efficient pure
NE (PNE) is for R agents to access and N − R agents to yield). This
is not the case for CA3NONY , which converges to an equilibrium
that is not just efficient but fair as well. Due to the enforced mon-
itoring scheme, all agents acquire the same amount of resources.
As a measure of fairness, we will use the Jain index [22]. The Jain
index is widely used by economists, and exhibits a lot of desirable
properties such as: population size independence, continuity, scale
and metric independence, and boundedness. For an allocation game
of N agents, such that the nth agent receives an allocation of xn ,
the Jain index is given by J(x) = |∑n∈N xn |2 / N ∑n∈N x2n . An
allocation is considered fair, iff J(x) = 1, x = (x1, . . . ,xN )⊤.
Table 2 presents the expected Jain Index of the evaluated algo-
rithms at the end of the time horizon T . CA3NONY converges to a
fair equilibrium, achieving a Jain index of 1. The EXP4 and EXP4.P
were the fairest amongst the bandit algorithms, achieving a Jain
index of close to 1. This is to be expected since the set of expertsM
is limited to the same set of equilibria that CA3NONY converges
to. On the other hand, EXP3 and CEXP3 performed considerably
worse, with the EXP3 exhibiting the worst performance in terms of
fairness, equal to a PNE’s: JPN E (x) = R2NR = 1K = JEXP3(x).
4.2.3 Average Payoff. The average payoff corresponds to the
total discounted payoff an agent would receive in the time horizon
T . Table 3 presents the average payoff for the studied algorithms.
The clustered pairs of bandit algorithms exhibited < 1% difference,
hence we included the average value of the pair. The discount
factor was set to δ = 0.99. At the top half we do not assume any
Table 2: Fairness (Jain Index), K = R,N = R × K .
R = 2 R = 4 R = 8 R = 16
CA3NONY 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
EXP3 0.5000 0.2500 0.1250 0.0625
CEXP3 0.7018 0.5865 0.5341 0.9638
EXP4 1.0000 0.9999 0.9959 0.9198
EXP4.P 1.0000 0.9999 0.9798 0.7503
Table 3: Average Payoff, K = R,N = R × K .
R = 2 R = 4 R = 8 R = 16
CA3NONY 45.4 15.7 -5.3 -23.0
CA3NONY* 20.0 -22.4 -50.6 -72.6
(C)EXP3 -72.4 -93.1 -99.8 -100.0
EXP4(.P) -59.0 -81.0 -90.7 -95.4
CA3NONY 53.3 79.0 502.5 4057.5
CA3NONY* 23.8 -55.5 -1337.1 -26723.9
(C)EXP3 -84.0 -331.0 -4175.7 -60595.1
EXP4(.P) -68.4 -288.4 -3807.1 -62631.5
indifference period, while at the bottom half we assume linear
indifference period (δt = 1,∀t ≤ Tind , where Tind is given by Eq.
8). Recall that CA3NONY and the bandit algorithms do not incur
any cost for monitoring resources, while CA3NONY* incurs a cost
equal to the collision cost ζ .
Once more, CA3NONY (and even CA3NONY*) significantly out-
performs all the bandit algorithms. The latter have relatively similar
performance, with EXP4 and EXP4.P being the best amongst them.
It is worth noting that adding an indifference period has a dramatic
effect on the results. Comparing CA3NONY to bandit algorithms
we observe that CA3NONY achieves a large increase on average
payoff, while the opposite happens for the bandit algorithms. This
is because the learning rule of Alg. 1 prohibits from accessing an al-
ready claimed resource, thus minimizing collisions. On the contrary,
bandit algorithms constantly explore (they assign a positive proba-
bility mass to every arm) which leads to collisions. In a multi-agent
system where every agent learns this can have a cascading effect.
The latter becomes apparent when fixing δ = 1 for Tind steps. The
collision cost remains high for longer which, as seen by Table 3,
has a significant impact on the bandit algorithms’ performance.
4.2.4 Large Scale Systems. The innovation of CA3NONY stems
from the adoption of a simple convention, which allows its applica-
bility to large scale MAS. To evaluate the latter, Fig. 2 and 3 depict
the convergence time for increasing number of resources R, and
increasing system congestion (NR = K) respectively. Both graphs
are in a double logarithmic scale, and the error bars represent one
standard deviation of uncertainty. The total number of agents is
given by N = R × K . Thus, the largest simulations involve 16.384
agents. Along with CA3NONY, we depict the fastest (based on the
previous simulations) of the bandit algorithms, namely EXP3. In
both cases we acquire ×103 − ×105 faster convergence. The above
validate CA3NONY’s performance in both scenarios with abun-
dance (N ≈ R or small K), and scarcity of resources (N ≫ R or
large K). As depicted, CA3NONY is significantly faster than the
Figure 2: Convergence time: increasing #resources R, vary-
ing context space size K , N = R × K (double log scale).
Figure 3: Convergence time: increasing congestion (NR = K),
varying #resources R, N = R × K (double log scale).
EXP3 and can gracefully handle increasing number of resources,
and high congestion. Finally note that, in several of the simulations,
EXP3 was unable to reach its convergence goal of 90% efficiency
(utilization of resources) in a reasonable amount of computation
time (1.5× 108 time-steps), hence the resulting gaps in EXP3’s lines
in Fig. 2 and 3. Especially in situations with scarcity of resources
the utilization was significantly lower.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed CA3NONY, an anti-coordination frame-
work under rationality constraints. It is based on a simple, human-
inspired convention of courtesy which prescribes a positive back-
off probability in case of a collision. Coupled with a monitoring
scheme which deters the monopolization of resources, we proved
that the induced strategy constitutes an ϵ-subgame-perfect equilib-
rium.We compared CA3NONY to state-of-the-art bandit algorithms,
namely EXP3, EXP4, and EXP4.P. Simulation results demonstrated
that CA3NONY outperforms these algorithms by achieving more
than two orders of magnitude faster convergence, a fair allocation,
and higher average payoff. The aforementioned gains suggest that
human-inspired conventions may prove beneficial in other ad-hoc
coordination scenarios as well.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Bound (3)
In this section we provide a formal proof of bound (3). The proof is
an adaptation of the convergence proof of [13]. We will prove the
following theorem:
Theorem A.1. For N agents and R ≥ 1, K ≥ 1, 0 < p < 1 the
expected number of steps before the learning algorithm converges to
an efficient correlated equilibrium of the allocation game for every
k ∈ K is O
(
(K logK + 2K)R 2−p2(1−p)
(
1
p logN + R
)
+ 1
)
.
We begin with the case of having multiple agents but only a sin-
gle resource (R = 1). We will describe the execution of the proposed
learning rule as a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) 3. In every
time-step, each agent performs a Bernoulli trial with probability
of ‘success’ 1 − p (remain in the competition), and failure p (back-
off). When N agents compete for a single resource, a state of the
system is a vector {0, 1}N denoting the individual agents that still
compete for that resource. But, since the back-off probability is the
same for everyone, we are only interested in how many agents are
competing and not which ones. Thus, in the single resource case
(R = 1), we can describe the execution of the proposed algorithm
using the following chain:
Definition A.2. Let {Xt }t ≥0 be a DTMC on state space S =
{0, 1, . . . ,N } denoting the number of agents still competing for
the resource. The transition probabilities are as follows:
Pr (Xt+1 = N |Xt = 0) = 1 restart
Pr (Xt+1 = 1 |Xt = 1) = 1 absorbing
Pr (Xt+1 = j |Xt = i) =
(
i
j
)
pi−j (1 − p)j i > 1, j ≤ i
(all the other transition probabilities are zero)
Intuitively, this Markov chain describes the number of individ-
uals in a decreasing population, but with two caveats: The goal
(absorbing state) is to reach a point where only one individual
remains, and if we reach zero, we restart.
Lemma A.3. [13] Let A = {0, 1}. The expected hitting time of the
set of states A in the Markov chain described in Definition A.2 is
O
(
1
p logN
)
.
Definition A.4. Let {Yt }t ≥0 be a DTMC on state space S =
{0, 1, . . . ,N } with the following transition probabilities (two ab-
sorbing states, 0 and 1):
Pr (Yt+1 = 0 |Yt = 0) = 1 absorbing
Pr (Yt+1 = 1 |Yt = 1) = 1 absorbing
Pr (Yt+1 = j |Yt = i) =
(
i
j
)
pi−j (1 − p)j i > 1, j ≤ i
(all the other transition probabilities are zero)
Let hAi denote the hitting probability of a set of states A, starting
from state i . We will prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.5. The hitting probability of the absorbing state {1},
starting from any state i ≥ 1, of the DTMC {Yt } of Definition A.4 is
given by Eq. 9. This is a tight lower bound.
h{1}i = Ω
(
2(1 − p)
2 − p
)
, ∀i ≥ 1 (9)
Proof. For simplicity we denote hi
∆
= h
{1}
i . We will show that
for p ∈ (0, 1), hi ≥ λ = 2(1−p)2−p ,∀i ≥ 1 using induction. First note
3For an introduction on Markov chains see [28]
that since state {0} is an absorbing state, h0 = 0, h1 = 1 ≥ λ and
that λ ∈ (0, 1).
The vector of hitting probabilitieshA = (hAi : i ∈ S = {0, 1, . . . ,N })
for a set of states A is the minimal non-negative solution to the
system of linear equations 10:

hAi = 1, if i ∈ A
hAi =
∑
j∈S
pi jhAj , if i < A
(10)
By replacing pi j with the probabilities of Definition A.4, the
system of equations 10 becomes:

hAi = 1, if i ∈ A
hAi =
i∑
j=0
(i
j
)
pi−j (1 − p)jhAj , if i < A
(11)
Base case:
h2 = (1 − p)2h2 + 2p(1 − p)h1 + p2h0 = 2p(1 − p)1 − (1 − p)2 =
2(1 − p)
2 − p ≥ λ
Inductive step: We assume that ∀j ≤ i − 1 ⇒ hj ≥ λ. We will prove
that hi ≥ λ,∀i > 2.
hi =
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
pi−j (1 − p)jhj
= pih0 + ipi−1(1 − p)h1 +
i−1∑
j=2
(
i
j
)
pi−j (1 − p)jhj + (1 − p)ihi
≥ pih0 + ipi−1(1 − p)h1 +
i−1∑
j=2
(
i
j
)
pi−j (1 − p)jλ + (1 − p)ihi
= ipi−1(1 − p) + [1 − pi − (1 − p)i − ipi−1(1 − p)]λ + (1 − p)ihi
⇒ hi = λ − p
i
1 − (1 − p)i λ +
ipi−1(1 − p)
1 − (1 − p)i (1 − λ)
We want to prove that hi ≥ λ:
ipi−1(1 − p)
1 − (1 − p)i (1 − λ) ≥
pi
1 − (1 − p)i λ ⇒
ipi−1(1 − p) + pi − pi
pi + ipi−1(1 − p) ≥ λ ⇒
1 − p
i
pi + ipi−1(1 − p) ≥
2(1 − p)
2 − p ⇒
pi
pi + ipi−1(1 − p) ≤
p
2 − p ⇒
pi (2 − p) ≤ p[pi + ipi−1(1 − p)] ⇒
2 − 2p − i + ip ≤ 0⇒ 2 − i − p(2 − i) ≤ 0⇒
(2 − i)(1 − p) ≤ 0⇒ 2 − i ≤ 0
which holds since i > 2. The above bound is also tight since ∃i ∈
S : hi = λ, specifically h2 = λ. □
Plugging the above hitting probability bound to the convergence
proof of [13], results on the required bound.
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